Bringing Ancients Into the Gender Debate

From time to time I run across a post online that makes me stop and do a double take because my BS radar sounds off. I can usually tell something is off about it, but maybe I am not sure exactly what is off about it. I can’t put my finger on it. So I look into it, and when I do I usually find out what that something is. Recently I saw a number of posts claiming that the ancient Hebrews recognized six, seven, or eight genders. Different posts had different numbers and that in and of itself is red flag. Sometimes the post makes stronger claims that the Hebrew Scriptures (Old Testament) supposedly teach that there are eight genders.

This was news to me but simply being unfamiliar to me certainly does not mean it is false. I am always learning new things and over the years I have learned that there are always things I don’t know, including things I thought I knew rather well. So my first response was not, “That’s ridiculous.” It was: I should probably look into this if for no other reason other than is 2, 6, 7, or 8?. What I did find when I did some research was considerably more interesting than either side of the usual culture-war version of the story.

What was interesting is to see that rabbis had struggled with some issues related to gender and how to apply the law. I found that there really are rabbinic categories for people whose bodies did not fit neatly into the ordinary male and female classifications used by Jewish law. Ancient rabbis discussed ambiguous genitalia, atypical sexual development, infertility, castration, and people whose physical characteristics made applying laws written for men or women more complicated. Those differences seem to make complications for the law and they wanted to be diligent and explore how the law might apply in those different circumstances.

What I found much harder to defend historically is the leap from that to a claim that “the ancient Hebrews believed in eight genders,” particularly when gender is being used in the modern Western sense of an internal or social identity distinct from biological sex. It becomes still harder when someone says those eight genders are found in the Old Testament. News flash, they aren’t.

Look, we don’t need another excuse to fight about gender. The people of the past deserve to be allowed to remain people of the past. We should resist the temptation to recruit them into our contemporary arguments. Especially since they have a very different cultural context. It is historically dishonest to try and force them into our modern categories. However, that does not mean we can’t learn from them on how they wrestled with the issue of gender. That is actually beneficial.

“Eight Genders in the Old Testament”

One of the most important things I discovered is that this issue is found largely within rabbinic Judaism, not simply “the ancient Hebrews” and certainly there is no “list” found somewhere in Genesis, Leviticus, or Deuteronomy. Where you find discussion of these “genders” is in the Babylonian Talmud, which contains material produced and shaped largely by rabbis from roughly the third through fifth centuries. So what we are dealing with is Jewish texts of late antiquity, many centuries removed from the earliest periods represented in the Hebrew Bible. So no, it is not in the five books of Moses or the Old Testament.

That doesn’t make their insight unimportant. Far from it. Rabbinic literature is extraordinarily important for understanding the development of Judaism. But “the rabbis discussed this” and “the Old Testament teaches this” are not interchangeable statements. That alone should make us slow down and pump the brakes. Certainly, honest and accurate descriptions and posts would not use such sensationalistic clickbait.

That leaves the Talmud 

I found a list on My Jewish Learning and it contains seven categories:

  • זָכָר (zākār, male),
  • נְקֵבָה (neqēvāh, female),
  • אַנְדְּרוֹגִינוֹס (androgynos, a person possessing both male and female sexual characteristics),
  • טֻמְטוּם (tumtum, a person whose sexual anatomy is concealed or indeterminate),
  • אַיְלוֹנִית (aylonit, a woman whose expected female sexual development does not occur and who is presumed infertile),
  • סְרִיס חַמָּה (saris ḥammah, a man whose sexual development or reproductive capacity is naturally impaired), and
  • סְרִיס אָדָם (saris adam, a man rendered a eunuch through human action, such as castration or injury).

You may have noticed something already. That’s seven, not eight. In fact, the same My Jewish Learning URL that circulated under the title “The Eight Genders in the Talmud” carries the title “The Seven Genders in the Talmud.” Is it a typo? More importantly, the site contains a qualification that I think should accompany almost every social-media post on the subject.

“The rabbis did not use the word gender as we do today.”

I will have more to say about that later. For now, note that this qualification changes quite a bit in this discussion. The article goes on to say that these rabbinic classifications are distinguished primarily by “physical and biological realities,” even though those bodily differences had significant legal and social consequences. That is considerably more nuanced than any meme or blog post I have seen on the subject. Why let little things like facts get in the way of a good clickbait post?

What Were the Rabbis Actually Doing?

To understand these categories, we need to enter their world and culture rather than dragging them into ours. Rabbinic law frequently assigned different obligations and legal consequences to men and women. That creates an obvious problem when someone’s body cannot easily be placed into one category or the other. Which laws apply? What happens with marriage? Inheritance? Ritual obligations? Levirate marriage? Temple participation? Reproduction? Those are the sorts of questions that the rabbis were trying to answer in their commentaries.

Consider the אַנְדְּרוֹגִינוֹס (androgynos, a person with both male and female sexual characteristics). Rabbinic texts sometimes treat the androgynos like a man, sometimes like a woman, sometimes like both, and sometimes like neither. The legal difficulty is genuine. The body does not fit easily into the ordinary categories upon which many of the laws depend. My Jewish Learning site notes that the rabbinic concern was largely halakhic, meaning concerned with the application of Jewish law. We have some of the same questions today, such as which locker room do they use. That doesn’t imply another gender it simple recognizes a reality that doesn’t seem to fit nicely into a category as the law is trying to address and more importantly it is about which biological sex category in which to place them.

Likewise, the טֻמְטוּם (tumtum) concerns a person whose sex characteristics cannot readily be determined. Again, the problem for the rabbis was not simply philosophical speculation about identity. They needed to know which laws applied. Again, the question is what happens when biological sex is not apparent: into which category should the person be placed with regard to the law?

The אַיְלוֹנִית (aylonit) is even more revealing. One source discusses a woman who reaches adulthood without the expected signs of female puberty and describes physical characteristics associated with that condition. The discussion repeatedly uses feminine grammar and concerns her reproductive status. This is an important clue. The rabbis clearly recognized that biological development could be atypical. However, recognizing atypical development is not automatically the same thing as constructing a modern gender identity. Sure today those concepts may overlap in some modern interpretations. However, they should not be treated as synonyms and certainly we should not suppose the rabbis even understood modern concepts of gender.

The Eunuch

The category that first made me suspicious of the viral formulation was the eunuch. If a man was castrated, did the rabbis suddenly believe that he had become another gender? I found that the Rabbinic texts do not seem to work that way.

For example, Mishnah Yevamot 8:4 discusses the סְרִיס אָדָם (saris adam, man-made eunuch) in connection with levirate marriage. Rabbi Akiva, one of the most influential sages of early rabbinic Judaism, is important here because he specifically explains how the law should apply to eunuchs. His reasoning gives us some insight into how the rabbis themselves were thinking about these categories.

Rabbi Akiva argues that a man-made eunuch remains subject to certain aspects of the levirate-marriage law because there had once been a time when he was capable of reproduction. For example caring for an providing for the widow. By contrast, a eunuch who had never possessed that reproductive capacity was treated differently. The question is therefore not whether castration had transformed the man into another gender. The issue was whether his physical condition changed how a law concerned with marriage, kinship, and producing descendants could be applied in different situations. His body had changed, and consequently some of the legal consequences changed, but the discussion continued to place him within male marriage and kinship structures.

The obvious issue related to levirate-marriage would be the producing a heir for a deceased brother. A eunuch would not be able to fulfill that duty.

In other words, the conceptual movement appears much closer to this: a male loses or lacks reproductive capacity, therefore certain laws now apply differently. It does not appear to be: a male loses reproductive capacity, therefore he has become a new gender.

It does not appear to be: a male loses reproductive capacity, therefore he has acquired a new subjective gender identity.

That doesn’t mean castration was socially insignificant. Obviously it wasn’t. Losing reproductive capacity, or suffering damage to one’s genitalia, could have enormous legal, social, and personal consequences in the ancient world.

But “a legally distinct kind of man for certain purposes” is not necessarily the same proposition as “a separate gender identity.” We should be careful not to conflate them.

Presentism: Making the Past Speak Our Language

There is a useful word for the historical problem here: presentism. Presentism occurs when we interpret the past primarily through the assumptions, categories, and controversies of our own time. This is closely related is anachronism, which happens when we assign a concept to people who lived before that concept existed in the relevant form. These are things we all do this to some degree. I would say it is almost impossible not to. We cannot climb outside our own century and look at another culture with completely neutral eyes. But good history tries.

This is where another pair of scholarly terms that are helpful here: emic and etic. An “emic description” attempts to understand the categories used by the people themselves. An “etic description” applies an analytical framework from outside the culture. That said, there is nothing inherently wrong with etic analysis. Historians do it constantly. A modern scholar can reasonably say, “I want to examine rabbinic eunuchs through the lens of gender studies.” That tells me what analytical tool the scholar is using.

But that is different from saying, “The rabbis believed eunuchs constituted one of eight gender identities.” The first tells me how we are analyzing them. The second tells me how they supposedly understood themselves. That second claim requires much more evidence. Whenever historians move from what a person actually said or wrote to claims about that person’s motives, internal thinking, or self-understanding, we should slow down. Historians can certainly make reasonable inferences from texts and context, but an inference is still an inference. There is really only one direct way to know what someone thought about himself: for that person to tell us. Everything beyond that has to be argued from the evidence rather than simply assumed.

This is where Max Strassfeld becomes particularly interesting. Strassfeld is a contemporary scholar whose work brings together rabbinic literature, Jewish studies, and transgender studies. In the 2023 book Trans Talmud: Androgynes and Eunuchs in Rabbinic Literature, Strassfeld intentionally rereads these ancient rabbinic discussions through questions raised by modern transgender and queer studies. The book places figures such as eunuchs and androgynes at the center of the discussion and asks what they can tell us about how the rabbis constructed masculinity, sex, gender, and Jewish law. In other words, Strassfeld is useful to us precisely because this is an example of the etic approach I have been talking about: a modern scholar openly applying a contemporary analytical framework to ancient texts. That is a perfectly legitimate scholarly project, whether one agrees with every conclusion or not, but it is not the same thing as demonstrating that the ancient rabbis themselves possessed our modern concepts of transgender or nonbinary identity. They did not.

In fact, Strassfeld makes that distinction surprisingly explicit. When asked about these figures in rabbinic literature, Strassfeld says, “I don’t think androgynes or eunuchs in rabbinic literature are literally trans or intersex.” The point of his project is not that the rabbis secretly held twenty-first-century ideas about gender. Strassfeld’s argument is that studying how differently the rabbis organized sex and gender can help modern readers reconsider categories that we often assume are natural or obvious.

That qualification is important and much mor nuanced than the meme’s or blog posts suggest. We can debate whether Strassfeld’s modern interpretive framework is persuasive, useful, or perhaps pushing too far in places. But even a scholar deliberately engaged in transgender history is not claiming, “The Talmud says there are eight genders.” The actual argument is much more complicated.

Unfortunately, this is also where we tend to lose people. The simplified and incorrect version is easier to remember, easier to repeat, and much more useful as a weapon in political or cultural arguments. “The Talmud had eight genders” fits neatly into a meme and catchy as a title for a blog post. The actual history, unfortunately does not.

What we have instead is a modern appropriation of an ancient tradition for a contemporary theological or political purpose. That may be a legitimate thing to do, provided we are honest that we are doing it and qualify it accordingly. But it is not the same as proving that ancient rabbis understood sex and gender through twenty-first-century categories. Once we blur those two things together, we have crossed from interpretation into presentism. We are no longer asking what the rabbis thought; we are claiming that they taught or thought something they did not, and arguably could not, have taught or thought.

Translating from One Culture to Another Requires Caution

Anthropology gives us plenty of reasons to be careful about translating sexual and gender categories from one society directly into another. Arguably, we should exercise the same caution even when comparing Western culture today with Western culture thirty years ago. Culture is dynamic and constantly changing, more like waves on the ocean than a fixed shoreline. There is continual undulation. Meanings shift, categories change, and words gather new associations over time. So before we assume that a term or behavior means the same thing across cultures, or even across generations within the same culture, it is worth slowing down. Let’s look at a modern example of just how difficult that translation can be.

Afghanistan illustrates the problem with imposing contemporary Western categories of sexual orientation and gender identity onto other cultures. Behaviors or social roles that a Western observer might immediately label gay, bisexual, transgender, or nonbinary may be understood quite differently within the culture itself, where identity can be organized around age, social role, gender expression, sexual position, occupation, and other culturally specific distinctions.

A useful example comes from the work of anthropologist Ali Abdi. In his 2022 Yale dissertation, Bachahs, Murats, and Shākhs: The Culture of Same-Sex Desire in Afghanistan, Abdi draws on ethnographic research conducted primarily in Kabul, with additional research in Bamyan and Mazar-i-Sharif, to examine Afghan categories of sexual and gendered personhood. He later developed some of this work in peer-reviewed articles on the murat and the bachah. What makes his research useful for our discussion is that he does not simply take contemporary Western categories such as gay, transgender, or nonbinary and paste them onto Afghan culture. Instead, he tries to understand the categories that developed within Afghan and regional cultural contexts themselves.

One of those terms is murat. Abdi describes the murat as a relatively recent Afghan category, especially associated with male-born, nonmasculine dancers and sex workers in Kabul and other cities. The term appears to have entered Afghan usage through contact with South Asian hijra and khwaja sira communities. But even here, simply translating murat as “transgender woman” would be too easy. The category can include a mixture of biological sex, feminine or nonmasculine gender expression, occupation, performance, social role, and same-sex desire. Some of those features sound familiar to Western readers, but the combination does not line up neatly with any single category in our present vocabulary.

A murat is a self-identified category of personhood among the male-born, nonmasculine dancers and sex workers Abdi studied. It is not dependent on being young or beardless and therefore does not naturally disappear when someone reaches ordinary male adulthood. Abdi describes murat as involving gender expression, sexuality, occupation, performance, and social identity. His informants actually called themselves murats. That is much closer to an ongoing social identity than bachah is, although Abdi explicitly warns against simply translating it as “gay” or “transgender.”

The term bachah presents a different problem. Bachah literally means “boy” or “son” in Dari Persian, but in the cultural setting Abdi examines it can refer more specifically to the young, attractive, beardless male. Historically, the bachah occupied an aesthetic and sometimes erotic place within Afghan and broader Turko-Persianate culture. The category is also associated with bachah bāzī, a practice that in modern times has often involved exploitation and abuse of boys. That distinction has to be made clearly. The point here is not to romanticize or defend the practice, but to notice that the category itself was organized around age, beardlessness, social role, masculinity, and erotic status rather than around something equivalent to a modern Western identity such as “gay man.” The same behavior does not necessarily produce the same identity category.

A bachah is fundamentally an age- and appearance-related social category: the desirable, beardless young male. Abdi says bachah-hood could extend into the late teens or even the early to mid-twenties as long as the person remained beardless and had not married and “settled.” Growing a beard, marrying, and assuming the social role of an adult man ordinarily marked the transition out of bachah-hood. In that sense, bachah is a temporary status between boyhood and socially recognized manhood, not ordinarily a lifelong sexual identity. Abdi specifically describes former dancers who later became married fathers.

So let me make this clear. In that cultural framework, intercourse between two bearded men would be regarded as homosexual activity and therefore wrong. But if one of the males were a beardless bachah, the act could be understood differently. Can you see why this does not translate neatly into our Western categories of gay or bisexual?

There is an interesting parallel here with ancient Greek pederasty. Greek society also recognized age-structured erotic relationships between an older male and a younger, typically beardless male, but those relationships did not map neatly onto modern Western categories such as “gay” or “bisexual.” Nor should we assume that the Greek ἐρώμενος (erōmenos, younger beloved) and the Afghan bachah were culturally equivalent simply because both involved a socially significant category of the beardless young male. They arose in different societies, with different institutions, expectations, moral assumptions, and social meanings. The resemblance is useful precisely because it demonstrates the problem: even two nonmodern cultural categories that look similar from a distance do not line up perfectly with each other, much less with contemporary Western sexual identities. Abdi himself emphasizes that the meaning of bachah has been in constant flux over time.

Then there is the older Afghan term īzak. Abdi describes the īzak as someone socially understood as neither fully man or male nor woman or female. At first glance, a Western reader might immediately reach for words such as “transgender” or “nonbinary.” Perhaps those terms can be useful as rough points of comparison, but they are still our terms. The īzak developed within a different cultural system, with its own assumptions about masculinity, femininity, sexuality, social role, and the body. Calling the īzak “nonbinary” may help a modern Western reader get into the general neighborhood, but it should not fool us into thinking we have arrived at the exact address.

That is really the important point. The bachah, īzak, and murat overlap in some ways, and their histories intersect, but they are not interchangeable. The bachah is organized largely around youth, beardlessness, and an erotic or social role. The īzak is an older category associated with a person understood as falling outside the ordinary man/woman distinction. The murat is a newer category that can combine nonmasculine gender expression, performance, sexuality, occupation, and social identity. None maps perfectly onto the boxes most Westerners would instinctively reach for.

Abdi’s research is especially useful because he explicitly resists explaining the murat simply as the Afghan adoption of Euro-American categories such as “gay” or “transgender.” Instead, he places the development of the murat within a regional history that includes the bachah, the īzak, and South Asian categories such as the hijra and khwaja sira. In other words, even in a globalized twenty-first-century world where Western terminology is readily available, local cultures continue to organize sex, gender, desire, and social roles in their own ways.

And if translation is this difficult between cultures that exist at the same time, imagine the additional problems involved when we cross not only cultures but nearly two thousand years of history.

That is why I think this modern example matters to the rabbinic discussion. Our first instinct is often to see a category that looks vaguely familiar and immediately give it one of our names. But similarity is not identity. A murat is not automatically a transgender woman, a bachah is not automatically a gay man, and an īzak is not automatically a nonbinary person simply because those are the closest categories available to us. Our taxonomy may not be their taxonomy. And that is precisely the caution we need when reading the rabbis.

There is another wrinkle here that makes the translation problem even more uncomfortable. The older or more masculine male partner does not necessarily understand himself as homosexual, gay, or even bisexual simply because he has sexual relations with another male. In Abdi’s account, masculinity is organized in part around sexual role: the man is imagined as the penetrator rather than the penetrated, and the masculine partners of murats, whom they call shākhs, can continue to understand themselves as men within that cultural framework.

From a contemporary Western perspective, if a man has sexual relationships with both women and males, we might describe his behavior as bisexual. But that does not mean he would understand “bisexual” as an identity that describes him. This becomes even more striking when we remember that same-sex relations are currently criminalized in Afghanistan and people accused of homosexual acts face severe punishment under Taliban rule.

Yet bachah bāzī has historically not been understood within Afghan society simply as “homosexuality.” Is that turning a blind eye? Hypocrisy? A distinction between sexual roles that makes sense inside their cultural framework but looks contradictory from ours? Perhaps elements of all three can occur, depending on the people and circumstances. I am not sure we can answer that neatly from the outside, and that is partly the point. It is an uncomfortable discussion, but it reminds us that our categories of heterosexual, homosexual, and bisexual are not universal labels that every culture has used to organize sexual behavior and identity.

That was admittedly a long rabbit trail, but I think it matters. Cross-cultural equivalencies are rarely perfect, and even categories that look similar on the surface can carry very different meanings once we understand the culture behind them.

The Rabbis Are More Interesting Without the Culture War

I am not trying to recruit the rabbis into either the pro- or anti-transgender side of today’s debates. In fact, refusing to enlist them in our culture war frees us to do something much more interesting: listen to what they were actually saying and then ask whether their reasoning might still help us think more carefully about these questions today.

What I find most interesting after looking into this is that the rabbinic texts do not need exaggeration. They are already telling us something important. The rabbis clearly understood that human biology did not always arrive in perfectly uncomplicated packages. They encountered ambiguous genitalia, atypical sexual development, infertility, eunuchs, and people whose bodies made the ordinary application of laws written for males and females more difficult. When reality did not fit neatly into the categories assumed by the law, they had to reason through what to do.

That should complicate simplistic claims that ancient people lived in some perfectly tidy world in which every human body fit effortlessly into one of two obvious boxes. They knew better because they encountered real people who did not always fit that neatly. The categories they developed were attempts to deal with those realities, particularly where they affected marriage, inheritance, reproduction, ritual obligations, and other areas of Jewish law.

But the reverse exaggeration does not help either. Saying that “Judaism has always taught eight genders just like modern gender theory” projects contemporary categories backward onto people who did not use them in the same way. Saying that “the Old Testament teaches eight genders” goes even further by moving the claim into an entirely different historical period and body of literature. The better approach is to let the rabbis be rabbis.

What I think we can legitimately learn from them is that categories are useful, but reality sometimes refuses to cooperate with the boxes we build. When that happened, the rabbis did not simply pretend the difficult cases did not exist. They wrestled with them. They distinguished between cases. They argued with one another. They tried to figure out how the law should apply when the ordinary assumptions behind it no longer worked.

That, perhaps, is the most useful lesson for us today. We do not have to pretend that the rabbis secretly anticipated twenty-first-century gender theory, nor do we have to pretend that ancient societies never encountered biological complexity. Both claims ask too much of the evidence.

I would be surprised if Jewish communities were alone in wrestling with these questions. Early Christian communities inhabited the same broader ancient world, and Christian theologians over the centuries undoubtedly had to confront some of the same biological realities. How they understood them, and whether their categories differed from the rabbinic ones, would be worth exploring. But that will have to be another rabbit trail for another post.

What Does a Bacon Cheeseburger Have To Do With This?

I suspect that at least some of these posts are attempting to do something beyond making an interesting historical observation. They function as a way of legitimizing a particular sexual ethic or gender identity in the eyes of people whose religious worldview may not affirm it. The argument becomes something like, “You think this is contrary to your tradition, but your own ancient rabbis recognized eight genders.” Maybe that is not always the intention of the person sharing the meme or article, but it certainly gives the claim some of its rhetorical power.

There is another part of this conversation that interests me even more because I think it gets beneath the argument about ancient categories.

Imagine that I want a bacon cheeseburger.

Traditional Jewish kashrut prohibits pork, and it also prohibits combining meat and dairy. Those rules carry real religious significance for observant Jews. Jewish tradition, however, also distinguishes between the covenantal obligations placed upon Jews and the more limited Noahide laws traditionally understood to apply to humanity generally. The full system of Jewish dietary law is therefore not something traditional Judaism ordinarily requires Gentiles to observe.

Suppose I am not Jewish and I want my bacon cheeseburger.

I do not need to prove that bacon was secretly permitted in ancient Judaism before I can eat it. I certainly do not need to develop a creative theory that the rabbis recognized eight different categories of pig and that bacon somehow belongs to one of the non-pork varieties. Of course, after solving that problem, I would still have the beef-and-cheese problem to contend with. That would be terrible history.

I can simply acknowledge that an observant Jew believes my bacon cheeseburger violates kashrut and then point out that I am not bound by Jewish dietary law. The observant Jew does not have to approve of my cheeseburger, and I do not need his approval before eating it. We can understand one another perfectly well and still disagree. That sounds almost embarrassingly obvious, but I think we have forgotten how important that principle is.

Now, the analogy only goes so far. Traditional Orthodox Judaism does not treat every question of sexual morality as though it were merely an internal dietary rule for Jews. Orthodox authorities continue to regard same-sex sexual activity as prohibited by Torah and Jewish law, while also calling for compassion and sensitivity toward Jews who experience same-sex attraction. Orthodox authorities have likewise rejected contemporary ideas of gender fluidity when they believe those ideas conflict with halakhah (הֲלָכָה Jewish law or “the way of walking”).  So I am not suggesting that an Orthodox Jew must say, “Well, that may be wrong for me, but there is no moral question for anyone else.” That would misrepresent Orthodox Judaism too.

My point is simpler. You do not need to make the ancient rabbis agree with you before you can disagree with Orthodox Judaism today. Judaism itself contains substantial disagreement on these issues. Orthodox Judaism generally maintains traditional restrictions, and Haredi Judaism, including most Hasidic communities, falls within that traditional Orthodox world. Reform Judaism, on the other hand, explicitly affirms LGBTQ+ Jews, same-sex relationships, transgender people, and people of diverse gender identities. The Conservative or Masorti movement has likewise formally affirmed the inclusion of transgender and gender-nonconforming Jews. A Jewish person wrestling with these questions therefore does not even face a single uniform contemporary Jewish answer. But none of those modern disagreements requires us to rewrite the ancient rabbis.

Someone can say, “Orthodox Judaism teaches that my relationship or gender identity is contrary to halakhah, and I disagree with Orthodox Judaism.” Another person can remain Orthodox and say, “I believe the traditional interpretation is correct.” A Reform Jew can reach a very different theological conclusion. Those are genuine disagreements about theology, morality, interpretation, and Jewish identity. What we should not do is pretend that disagreement disappears if we can conscript ancient rabbis into our side.

The bacon cheeseburger does not become kosher because I want to eat it. I also do not need to convince an Orthodox rabbi that it is kosher before I can order one, and more importantly, I do not need to justify my decision to that rabbi. But there is a flip side to this. If I want to become an Orthodox Jew, then I would be choosing to enter a community that expects me to live by its religious commitments, and that means giving up bacon cheeseburgers. That is part of what joining the tradition means. The same basic principle applies elsewhere. Becoming a Buddhist monk, a Christian monk, or joining any serious religious community usually involves accepting disciplines, boundaries, and sacrifices that come with that way of life. If I am unwilling to accept those commitments, then perhaps that is not the community I should join. That seems fairly simple.

Moral Disagreement Is Not the Same as Dehumanization

This is where the discussion becomes uncomfortable, because people can get worked up very quickly. I know the bacon cheeseburger analogy is not perfect. No analogy is. Push any analogy far enough and eventually it breaks. My point is not that Jewish dietary law and Christian sexual ethics are morally equivalent. The analogy is simply meant to illustrate a larger principle: people can live under different moral frameworks without having to rewrite one another’s traditions or demand agreement before they can coexist.

Traditional Christian sexual ethics, for example, generally does not treat sexual morality the way Judaism treats dietary restrictions, as though the rules apply only to members of a particular religious covenant. Christians who hold traditional views usually believe that sexual morality is grounded in creation, human nature, or a universal moral order. In other words, they may believe that certain actions are objectively wrong, not merely “wrong for Christians.”

That makes things more complicated.

People on both sides of moral disagreements can be tempted to push their values onto everyone else, and often neither side thinks that is what they are doing. Each may believe that society will suffer if the other side’s morality becomes dominant. Sometimes those concerns are not entirely imaginary. Societies can be harmed both by destructive behavior and by excessive attempts to control behavior. Liberty matters, but so do social obligations. Drawing the line between what people should be free to do and what society has a legitimate interest in regulating has never been simple.

That is why another distinction matters just as much: moral disapproval and coercion are not the same thing. I can believe something is morally wrong without believing that every morally wrong action should be prohibited by law. Human societies have always lived with disagreements about sex, alcohol, gambling, divorce, adultery, blasphemy, religious conversion, childrearing, marriage, diet, and countless other things. We have never agreed on all of them, and we probably never will.

Pluralism does not make those disagreements disappear. It gives us a way to live together while they remain. I think this is where arguments about gender often become unnecessarily destructive. At times, one side seems to treat moral affirmation as the price of recognizing another person’s dignity. At other times, people on the opposing side behave as though moral disagreement gives them permission for contempt, ridicule, or dehumanization. Neither follows from the disagreement itself.

Someone who identifies as transgender does not need to prove that Moses, Isaiah, Jesus, Paul, or the rabbis of the Mishnah would have understood gender exactly as we do today in order to make an argument for being treated with dignity and respect. That case should not depend upon successfully recruiting ancient religious authorities into a modern debate.

Likewise, a Christian does not have to pretend that contemporary understandings of gender are identical to historic Christian anthropology in order to treat a transgender person with kindness, patience, honesty, and respect. In fact, from within my own Christian worldview, treating people with dignity is not optional. Human beings are made in the image of God. I do not have to agree with everything someone believes about himself or herself before that obligation applies.

You do not need my moral approval in order for me to respect your dignity and liberty. And I do not need to surrender my moral convictions in order to respect yours. That seems to me a far healthier basis for genuine pluralism than trying to rewrite one another’s traditions until everyone conveniently agrees. We can argue about morality, theology, anthropology, and even public policy. We can attempt to persuade one another. But disagreement does not require dehumanization, and respecting another person does not require pretending that no real disagreement exists.

Let the Past Be the Past

This is ultimately why the “eight genders” claim bothers me. It is not because I find the rabbinic material threatening. Quite the opposite. I find it fascinating. What bothers me is taking something genuinely interesting and complicated and flattening it into a modern slogan.

The rabbis were dealing with real human beings whose bodies did not always fit neatly into the ordinary categories assumed by Jewish law. They encountered ambiguous genitalia, atypical sexual development, infertility, eunuchs, and other circumstances that complicated questions of marriage, reproduction, inheritance, ritual obligation, and social status. They noticed that reality does not always cooperate with the boxes we build for it, and when it did not, they reasoned through the consequences.

But recognizing biological complexity in rabbinic literature is not the same thing as discovering twenty-first-century gender theory in the Talmud, much less in the Old Testament. These discussions come largely from rabbinic Judaism centuries after many of the Hebrew Scriptures were written, and the categories themselves appear primarily concerned with bodies, reproduction, legal status, and the application of Jewish law. Modern scholars are certainly free to examine those texts through transgender, queer, feminist, or other contemporary frameworks. Those approaches may even reveal things worth considering. But we should remain honest about the distinction between how we are interpreting ancient people and how they understood themselves.

Our excursion into Afghanistan should make us even more cautious. If categories such as murat, bachah, and īzak do not translate cleanly into contemporary Western terms even though they exist in our own era, and if superficially similar categories in Afghanistan and ancient Greece do not perfectly correspond with one another, then we should be extraordinarily careful when translating categories across both culture and nearly two thousand years of history. Our taxonomy may not be their taxonomy.

That does not mean comparison is useless. Quite the opposite. Comparison can help us think. But similarity is not identity. Calling something roughly analogous to “transgender,” “nonbinary,” “gay,” or “bisexual” may help us get into the general neighborhood, but we should not mistake the neighborhood for the exact address.

We should also resist the temptation to make historical legitimacy carry more moral weight than it can bear. Someone today does not need to prove that ancient rabbis approved of a particular gender identity or sexual relationship in order to argue that people who hold that identity deserve dignity, liberty, and respect. Likewise, someone who belongs to a religious tradition does not have to rewrite that tradition before treating people who disagree with it decently.

That was the point of my admittedly strange bacon cheeseburger analogy. I do not have to make my bacon cheeseburger kosher before I can eat it, and an Orthodox rabbi does not have to declare it kosher before treating me respectfully. If, on the other hand, I decide that I want to become an Orthodox Jew, then I am voluntarily entering a community with obligations that may require me to give some things up. Moral disagreement, religious commitment, personal liberty, and mutual respect can all exist at the same time. They are not mutually exclusive.

History works best when we allow the dead to surprise us rather than requiring them to validate us. The moment we recruit the rabbis into our present political or cultural battles, we risk no longer listening to them. One side may want them to confirm a perfectly uncomplicated biological world. Another may want them to confirm contemporary gender theory. Perhaps they do neither.

Perhaps they were rabbis of late antiquity wrestling with Jewish law and real human bodies that sometimes refused to fit neatly into the categories their legal system expected. That is interesting enough without turning them into honorary members of either side of our modern culture war. And perhaps there is a lesson in that for us. Categories are useful, but reality is usually more complicated than our categories. Cultures change. Language changes. Moral frameworks differ. People disagree. We can argue about anthropology, theology, sex, gender, morality, and public policy. We can try to persuade one another and still believe the other person is wrong.

None of that requires us to distort the past, and none of it gives us permission to deny the humanity of the person standing across from us. We should be able to do both: tell the truth about the past and treat people well in the present. That really should not be too much to ask.

References

The Seven Genders in the Talmud, by Rachel Scheinerman, My Jewish Learning, https://www.myjewishlearning.com/article/the-eight-genders-in-the-talmud/

Yevamot 80b, The William Davidson Talmud (Koren – Steinsaltz) https://www.sefaria.org/Yevamot.80b

Trans Talmud, Androgynes and Eunuchs in Rabbinic Literature by Max K. Strassfeld ISBN: 9780520382053

Abdi, Ali, “Bachahs, Murats, and Shākhs: The Culture of Same-Sex Desire in Afghanistan” (2022). Yale Graduate School of Arts and Sciences Dissertations. 862. https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/gsas_dissertations/862

EUAA, ‘3.15. Persons with diverse SOGIESC’ in Country Guidance: Afghanistan, May 2026.

January 26, 2022 “Even If You Go to the Skies, We’ll Find You” LGBT People in Afghanistan After the Taliban Takeover https://www.hrw.org/report/2022/01/26/even-if-you-go-skies-well-find-you/lgbt-people-afghanistan-after-taliban-takeover

Abdi A. The Afghan Bachah and its Discontents: An Introductory History. Iranian Studies. 2023;56(1):161-180. doi:10.1017/irn.2022.42

Goodman, Martin, ‘Mishnah'(6 July 2015),in Lucy Grig (ed.), Oxford Classical Dictionary (New York, NY, online edn, Oxford Academic, 15 July 2015 – ), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780199381135.013.4222, accessed 13 Oct. 2026.

Trans Torah: Beyond the Binary, Rabbi Debora S. Gordon https://voices.sefaria.org/sheets/623737?lang=bi

September 18, 2014 the space between |  Stanford prof: Talmudic rabbis were into analyzing sexuality by Dan Schifrin Article in J.Weekly. https://jewishstudies.stanford.edu/news/our-new-director-prof-charlotte-fonrobert-j-weekly

The Eight Genders in the Talmud | My Jewish Learning, Posted By admin on April 20, 2022 https://www.jewishamericanheritagemonth.com/talmud-2/the-eight-genders-in-the-talmud-my-jewish-learning.php

Zellentin, Holger M., ‘Blood and Demons: Genesis 9 and Leviticus 17 to Q 6 Sūrat al-Anʿām 145–6 and Q 5 Sūrat al-Māʾida 3′, Law Beyond Israel: From the Bible to the Qur’an (Oxford, 2022; online edn, Oxford Academic, 22 Sept. 2022), https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199675579.003.0002, accessed 13 Oct. 2026.

Trans Talmud: Could a 1,500-Year-Old Book Have Any Relevance to The Struggle for Trans Equality and Liberation? By Shane Burley, Religion Dispatch, December 6, 2022 https://religiondispatches.org/2022/12/06/trans-talmud-could-1500-year-old-book-have-any-relevance-struggle-trans-equality-and

Abdi, A. (2024). The Afghan Murat: A Queer Subject at Transnational Crossroads. Men and Masculinities, 27(4), 355-374. https://doi.org/10.1177/1097184X241273240

Episode 25: The Many Genders of Judaism, Adventures in Jewish Studies, The Association for Jewish Studies Podcast, Guests: Max Strassfeld, S.J. Crasnow, Host: Erin Phillips https://www.associationforjewishstudies.org/podcasts/the-many-genders-of-judaism-transcript

Excerpt

Did ancient Judaism really recognize eight genders? The rabbinic texts are far more interesting than the meme. They reveal biological complexity, legal nuance, and the danger of forcing modern categories onto ancient cultures. We can learn from the past without rewriting it to fit today’s arguments.

Humanitas ad sui compassio

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