Some scientists, particularly in evolutionary psychology and sociobiology, have attempted to root moral codes in evolutionary foundations—arguing that behaviors like cooperation, honesty, or even sexual restraint evolved because they enhanced survival and reproductive success. However, when these attempts extend to justifying sexual behaviors like infidelity or deception as “adaptive strategies,” we start to see strange misalignments. Traits that may be evolutionarily advantageous—such as a male deceiving another into raising his offspring—conflict sharply with widely held moral values that prize fidelity, trust, and consent. In trying to retrofit evolutionary success into moral legitimacy, we risk confusing what was reproductively useful with what ought to be ethically commendable. I think there is an error somewhere here so set’s see where this goes.

When we talk about human sexuality from an evolutionary perspective, one question inevitably arises: why monogamy? Or more precisely—why has female monogamy been so heavily emphasized in many historical societies?

According to what evolutionary psychologists often refer to as the standard narrative, it all boils down to parental investment theory. Coined by Robert Trivers in the 1970s, this theory posits that the sex that invests more in offspring (usually females, due to gestation and nursing) will be more selective in choosing a mate. Conversely, the sex that invests less (typically males) will compete for access to the higher-investing sex. The evolutionary goal, in this view, is the successful passing on of one’s genes.

Let’s put that in simpler terms: because women invest more biologically in making babies, they’re pickier about who they mate with. Men, having less initial investment, are biologically incentivized to seek multiple partners—unless, of course, they choose to invest more heavily in one partner and her offspring.

But here’s the catch. A man raising children wants to be reasonably certain those children carry his DNA. Why expend resources of time and energy not perpetuating your DNA? From this perspective, female monogamy serves as a kind of biological insurance policy for paternal certainty. That’s where the anxiety around infidelity, paternity, and moral codes begins to form.

This is also where evolutionary psychology introduces us to the awkwardly named but technically recognized reproductive strategy known as the “sneaky fucker” strategy. (Yes, that’s actually the term used in the literature.)

Let’s imagine a scene: a dominant “alpha” male guards his mate, while a less dominant “beta” male quietly waits for an opportunity to mate with her when the alpha is distracted. The goal? To pass on his genes without taking on the burden of raising the child. If the female’s partner never finds out, the beta male has succeeded in outsourcing parental investment to someone else—leaving the alpha unwittingly raising a child that isn’t his.

This is where we observe an alternative evolutionary strategy emerging—one aimed at passing on genetic material without any parental investment. In many ways, it resembles a parasitic approach. This strategy, of course, depends entirely on deception. If our moral codes are to be grounded in evolutionary necessity or shaped by evolutionary expediency, then we are left with a perplexing framework—one that would, at some level, have to value deceit. After all, from a purely genetic standpoint, the most advantageous move might be to spread your genes as widely as possible while letting the bigger, stronger males invest their time and resources in raising your offspring. So if we’re aligning morality with evolutionary success, the question becomes: why isn’t deceit considered moral?

From a cold genetic standpoint, that’s a win. But from a moral and emotional standpoint? It’s hard not to see it as betrayal. Most of us, understandably, recoil at the thought of devoting time, energy, and resources to raise a child we believed was ours—only to learn otherwise. If we are to claim that all morality and social codes are merely outworkings of evolution, then even our visceral feeling of betrayal must serve an evolutionary purpose—perhaps as a defense mechanism to detect deception and protect one’s parental investment from being exploited.

And yet, evolution doesn’t care about feelings. It only “cares” about what works—what strategies get more genes into the next generation. That’s why deceit, under this model, can sometimes be rewarded.

But Should Genes Dictate Morality?

Here’s where things get murky. If we start grounding moral systems in evolutionary efficiency, we risk legitimizing deception, manipulation, and betrayal—because they “work” reproductively. But human societies don’t thrive on deceit. They thrive on trust, cooperation, and empathy.

This tension between biological utility and moral decency has puzzled philosophers and scientists alike. It’s not unlike the dilemma faced by Commander Adama in Battlestar Galactica: do we let our baser instincts dictate our future, or do we evolve not just technologically, but ethically?

Sidebar: The Problem with Personifying Nature

I often find myself uneasy with how we casually personify natural processes—talking about “selfish genes” as if they have intentions, desires, or a moral compass. The language can be useful as metaphor, but it risks implying agency where none exists. Genes don’t want anything. They don’t plan, conspire, or care. And yet, much of evolutionary theory relies on this kind of language to explain behavior.

Still, the metaphors raise unsettling questions. If genes could care, would they care about the individual, the offspring, the species as a whole—or only about replicating themselves? The answer, if we take the metaphor too literally, leads us to strange and sometimes contradictory conclusions. It leaves me wondering: is the story evolution tells us about nature one of blind efficiency, or is there something deeper we keep intuitively sensing—something that doesn’t quite fit into our equations?

Maybe, just maybe, that feeling of dissonance is trying to tell us something.

Whose Story Are We Telling—Ours or Evolution’s?

We often personify genes, saying they “want” this or that. But in truth, genes have no desires. They simply persist when they are good at copying themselves. And yet we, the conscious, moral creatures built on genetic scaffolding, do have desires. We desire meaning, fidelity, fairness, love.

So perhaps it’s time to ask: should we continue to root our ethics in evolutionary efficiency? Or is it possible—just possible—that what made us human was not our selfishness, but our capacity to transcend it?

Conclusion: When the Narrative Doesn’t Fit the Frame

What I’ve hoped to highlight here is that the standard narrative often presented in evolutionary psychology—or even its more nuanced variations—seems to falter when we take deception seriously. If we’re committed to a strictly naturalistic explanation for morality, one grounded entirely in reproductive strategy and genetic self-interest, we still seem to fall short of accounting for the full range of moral behavior we see in humanity today.

Evolutionary models often suggest we are “made that way”—that our behaviors are echoes of what best served our ancestors’ genes. But when the most reproductively successful strategy involves deception, as with the so-called “sneaky fucker” archetype, it raises a troubling inconsistency: if evolution is our moral compass, then shouldn’t deceit be considered virtuous?

That’s the dissonance. Either our attempt to root morality in evolutionary patterns is flawed, or the standard evolutionary narrative itself needs rethinking. Or perhaps morality transcends biology altogether—hinting at something more, something outside the genome.

I’m not trying to resolve that tension here. I’m just raising the question. Because if the best way to pass on your genes is to deceive others into raising your offspring, and if natural selection rewards that behavior, then by that logic, deceit should be moral.

But we don’t believe that. And maybe that tells us something worth listening to.

This is more of a raw thought on the subject—I haven’t completed all the reading in this area yet. I just wanted to point this out in case it sparks further reflection. Perhaps there’s a solid explanation out there, and I’m open to discovering it.

Excerpt

If morality evolved purely from reproductive strategy, why isn’t deceit—one of evolution’s most effective tactics—considered virtuous? This thought explores the tension between evolutionary explanations of behavior and our moral intuitions, raising the question: does morality emerge from biology, or does it transcend it?

References

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• The Red Queen: Sex and the Evolution of Human Nature, by Matt Ridley
• The Psychology of Human Sexuality 3rd Edition, by Justin J. Lehmiller
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• Sex at Dusk: Lifting the Shiny Wrapping from Sex at Dawn by Lynn Saxon
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