Introduction

In the realm of theological discourse, the exploration of divine foreknowledge stands as a cornerstone, inviting scholars and believers alike into a labyrinth of complex ideas and diverse perspectives. For avid readers of the Counterpoints Series or Spectrum Multiview Book Series, the allure lies in the rich tapestry of viewpoints they offer, allowing for a comprehensive examination of contentious topics within Christianity. However, for those craving a broader spectrum beyond the confines of Protestant Christian doctrine, a desire to engage with Orthodox and Catholic perspectives often lingers.

One such text that epitomizes the essence of this intellectual exchange is “Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views,” edited by James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy. This seminal work brings together four esteemed contributors, each championing a distinct stance on the perplexing issue of divine foreknowledge. Gregory A. Boyd, David Hunt, William Lane Craig, and Paul Helm step into the arena, representing the open-theism, simple-foreknowledge, middle-knowledge, and Augustinian-Calvinist views respectively.

Gregory A. Boyd, from Bethel College, advocates for the open-theism perspective, challenging traditional notions of divine omniscience. David Hunt, hailing from Whittier College, offers insights into the simple-foreknowledge view, adding nuance to the discourse. William Lane Craig, associated with Talbot School of Theology, navigates the intricate terrain of middle-knowledge, presenting a compelling case. Finally, Paul Helm, of Regent College, Vancouver, delves into the Augustinian-Calvinist viewpoint, steeped in centuries of theological tradition.

What makes this text truly invaluable is not only the presentation of these divergent viewpoints but also the rigorous engagement that follows. Each contributor responds to the arguments put forth by their counterparts, fostering a dynamic exchange of ideas. Editors James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy set the stage for this intellectual sparring, offering an introduction to the contemporary debate and a thoughtful conclusion that aids readers in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective.

Through this multifaceted exploration, readers are invited to grapple with profound questions about the nature of God and the intricacies of divine foreknowledge. As we journey through the pages of “Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views,” we embark on a quest for understanding, guided by the wisdom of scholars and the spirit of inquiry. This blog post will serve as a précis, distilling the essence of this seminal work and offering insights into the theological landscape it unveils. Join me as we unravel the mysteries of divine foreknowledge and illuminate the path towards deeper theological insight.

Written for my Essential Christian Doctrines class in 2014.

Divine Foreknowledge: Four Views, by James K. Beilby (Editor), Paul R. Eddy (Editor), Gregory A. Boyd (Contributor), David Hunt (Contributor), William Lane Craig (Contributor), Paul Helm (Contributor).

Introduction by Beilby and Eddy

Beilby and Eddy introduce the positions, debaters and format.  They conclude with comments about how the book is written to be as accessible as possible however, some topics discussed are necessarily a bit technical.

Open-Theism View by Gregory A. Boyd

Boyd starts by framing that the debate on God’s foreknowledge is about the content of reality, mainly creation.[1]  Boyd concedes that the issue of God’s infallible knowledge has been settled.[2]  Boyd’s position is that God is omniscient but that reality consists of both settled and unsettled, or open, aspects.  He holds that God settles what He decides to settle and leaves open (unsettled) what He leaves open. 

In this position, God alone is sovereign over all of history and is able to foretell the future. According to Boyd, the idea of a future that is partially open and partially settled is both coherent and plausible.[3] God left the future partially open because He left it up to us to decide and make some decisions.  Boyd argues that if God knew our actions then our actions become determined and thus, libertarian freedom is incoherent.

Boyd refers to Bible passages to support his position.  He points out that, none of the Bible passages that talk to God’s omniscience, require us to take them to mean that God knows the future exhaustively.[4]  In fact, he claims they all support the idea that God knows what He has settled in the future and left other things open and that it is unwarranted to claim that God exhaustively knows all future events.

Boyd makes the point that scripture speaks about the future in conditional terms.  For example, God regrets certain outcomes, human actions are unexpected to him, and God changes His mind.[5]  He argues that there is no good reason to take the passages anthropomorphically, as most scholars do.  By taking passages anthropomorphically, we are rejecting the biblical motif.[6]  Boyd concludes that if God speaks of the future in conditional terms, we should take it as meaning the future is conditional.

Boyd addresses a number of objects to the openness view.  To the objection that the passages should be taken anthropomorphic and phenomenological, Boyd that argues you have to make non-biblical presuppositions and miss the motif of the text.  For the objection that the openness view contradicts scripture, Boyd reiterates the evidence previously presented.  On the view that openness view undermines God’s omniscience, Boyd reiterates that the issue is not about the limits of God’s knowledge but the content of reality.

Addressing the argument that the openness view undermines God’s sovereignty, Boyd argues that God sovereignty does not require Him to exercise that sovereignty and does not prohibit Him from allowing man to have some sovereignty.[7] Finally, Boyd addressees the objection that the openness view is discomforting by arguing the idea that God is behind everything is far more discomforting. 

Simple-Foreknowledge Response

Hunt rejects Boyd’s attempt to reframe the debate from God’s knowledge to the content of reality.  He points out that Boyd and Helm think that foreknowledge depends on the world we live in.  Concerning the Biblical texts that Boyd cites, Hunt says the texts don’t absolutely require his interpretation and that he is oversimplifying the texts.  Hunt finds Boyd’s point that God refrains from intervening between and victim and the perpetrator much more disturbing.  Hunt concludes that the position of open theism is not an issue of concern for one’s salvation.   

A Middle-Knowledge Response

Craig reaffirms that the debate is, primarily, about the scope and perfection of God’s knowledge.  Craig argues that Boyd’s view undermines God’s omniscience.  Craig argues if future actions are true, it requires that an omniscient God must know that truth.  Craig points out that Boyd does not address the philosophical issues related to his position, instead he limits his focus on biblical passages.  Craig argues that you cannot have a biblically sound doctrine of providence and hold the open view.  Craig argues in favor of taking the biblical passages as anthropological because they are written from the human perspective.[8]

An Augustinian-Calvinist Response

Helm argues that Boyd can’t simply appeal to scripture because that degrades the debate to competing interpretations.  Helm argues that we must take the clear statements in scripture and use them to understand the dialogue statements that are cited by Boyd.  Helm concludes that humans cannot even want to want God, thus rely on God to work all things together for His will.

The Simple-Foreknowledge View by David Hunt

Hunt defines omniscient as God knowing all truth and no falsehood regardless if the truth is in the past, present or future.[9] Foreknowledge, then, is dealing with God’s omniscience as it relates to future events.  Hunt characterizes open theism as diminished foreknowledge and the middle-knowledge he as augmented foreknowledge.  In contrast, he characterizes his position as simple-foreknowledge.

Hunt argues that there is considerable biblical evidence for God’s knowledge of the future.  Further, Hunt argues the Christian concept of God as an ultimate being requires such knowledge.  Hunt also argues divine providence and sovereignty require perfect knowledge of the past, present and future.  Finally, Hunt argues that the consensus of leading theologians is his simple-foreknowledge position.

Hunt makes the case that simple-foreknowledge is compatible with human freewill and God’s providence.[10]  The general argument of incompatibility is that if God knows the future then that future is necessary, thus determined.  Hunt first calls into question what is meant by necessary.  He proposes God’s foreknowledge creates accidental (contingent) necessity.

Hunt continues to evaluate the Boethian solution which holds that God’s knowledge is atemporal thus the future is relative to us but not for God.[11] With God being outside of time, God’s foreknowledge is compatible human freedom.  Helm seems to find this solution the best for compatibility between foreknowledge and human freewill.[12]

An Open-Theism Response

Boyd agrees with Hunt that God knows future events.  However, he believes that fallacy of proponents of the classic foreknowledge is that they take examples from the Bible of God knowing some future event to mean that God knows all future events.  Boyd contends this is unwarranted.[13]

While Boyd agrees with most of the points made by Hunt concerning the compatibility of human freewill and God’s foreknowledge, he disagrees with Hunt’s characterization of open view as being diminished foreknowledge.  Boyd claims God is not ignorant of anything that is settled.  God simply does not know unsettled items.  Again Boyd claims the debate is about the content of reality and not the scope of God’s knowledge.  

Boyd disagrees with Hunt’s perspective that the middle-knowledge and reformed perspective give God more control than the simple-foreknowledge view while it grants God more provincial control than the open view. Boyd claims the open view gives God more control because in the simple-foreknowledge view God has no control of eternally settled events.  

A Middle-Knowledge Response

Craig characterizes Hunt’s position as fatalism that Hunt argues is compatible with libertarian freedom.   Craig concludes that Hunt’s solution is inconsistent with the concept of creaturely freedom because humans cannot refrain or chose not to do something in Hunt’s view. 

Craig points out that Hunt did not prove that fatalism is true other than to say the past was necessary. Craig evaluates the merits of hard verses soft facts and equates it to temporal indifference.  Craig points out that, if time travel was possible, past facts could be changed and they would not then be hard facts.  Therefore, the past could not be settled as a hard fact. 

An Augustinian-Calvinist Response

Helm argues that the proposition Hunt offers and the parallel with Zeno’s paradox seems wrong on first examination.  In other words, it goes against our reason and we know something is flawed with the Zeno’s paradox even if we are not able, initially, to see the flaw. 

Helm argues that if Hunt rejects the Principle of Alternative Possibilities (PAP) that he can co-opt the Augustinian-Calvinist position in his favor.  Helm adds that Hunt has mistaken Augustine’s view and argues that Augustine was not a compatibilist.[14] Later in the book, Hunt will claim that Helm mistakes Augustine’s position.[15]  Helm then concludes that if Hunt denies (PAP) then his position must be some sort of determinism.[16]

Helm then argues that determinism is distinct from fatalism.  Fatalism holds that if some future event is will happen no matter what is done.  Determinism, Helms claims, denies this. He suggests that Craig and Hunt should divide determinism into 3 categories, theological determinism, theological Frankfurtianism or theological decretalism.  Helm offers no definition for these categories other than theological Frankfurtianism and theological decretalism requires determinism while theological determinism does not.

The Middle-Knowledge View by William Lane Craig

Craig uses Charles Dickens’s, A Christmas Carol and how the ghost of Christmas future did not answer Scrooges question if the future was predetermined as a means to introduce the subject.  Craig contends that Scrooge was asking the wrong question.  He was asking what could or will happen when he should have asked what would be.  Craig describes would be knowledge as counterfactual knowledge.[17]

Craig argues that, typically, theologians will confirm that, as part of God’s omniscience, He also knows counterfactual knowledge.  Craig contends that the dispute amongst theologians is when God knows such counterfactual knowledge.  Craig argues that God, by definition, cannot exist in a state of ignorance, therefore, God must know all counterfactuals from eternity.  Craig sides with the Catholic theologian Luis de Molina[18] in asserting God’s counterfactual knowledge must be prior to His decrees.

Craig argues that by having God’s counterfactual knowledge prior to His decrees leaves room for human freewill.[19] This also allows God to create a world in which God can maximize the number of people who will exercise that freewill in order for God to accomplish his ultimate purposes.

Craig uses three lines of argument to support his middle-knowledge position.  First, Craig demonstrates biblical support by citing passages that illustrate God’s counterfactual knowledge.  Craig adds that most theologians have no issues with middle-knowledge.  He cites the biblical evidence only to show that the Bible allows for middle-knowledge. 

Craig argues that, theologically, middle-knowledge makes divine foreknowledge and human freewill compatible.  On the issue of Divine providence, Craig finds middle-knowledge superior to simple-foreknowledge.  He argues that God’s providential control makes more sense given middle-knowledge.  According to Craig, without middle-knowledge, the openness view becomes untenable. Craig also contends the Augustinian-Calvinist position makes God out to be the one who caused moral evil.  This leaves God with no way of holding people morally responsible for their actions. Craig argues that the middle-knowledge position does not suffer from the problematic theological issues that the other positions do.

Philosophically, Craig argues that the only tenable position is to assert the middle-knowledge position.  He points out that we have every reason to believe that there are counterfactuals of human freewill.[20]  Philosophically middle-knowledge makes foreknowledge and creaturely freedom compatible.

An Open-Theism Response

Boyd opens by claiming middle-knowledge is not far off from the open view.  In fact, he states the open view could be called neo-Molinism.  Boyd claims that with a slight modification the middle-knowledge view can be seen as an open view and overcome problems with the classic middle-knowledge position.  He contends he can add “might–counterfactuals”.  Boyd believes Craig errors in believing counterfactuals are exclusively what agents would or would not do.  Boyd claims counterfactuals go beyond this and include what they might do in other situations.

Boyd agrees Craig’s position has theological advantages but it still is problematic.  Boyd claims that middle-knowledge does not address the open motif of scripture.[21]  Philosophically, Boyd finds problems with eternal settledness and he finds it counterintuitive.

Boyd feels his neo-Molinism has advantages over the other positions because it allows for God’s providence and creaturely freedom. 

A Simple-Knowledge Response

Hunt states his position is closest to Craig’s.  Hunt claims middle-knowledge and simple-foreknowledge both resolve the tension between foreknowledge and human freewill.[22]

Hunt argues that the difference between middle-knowledge and simple-foreknowledge is a philosophical one.  Hunt’s concern is the notion of temporal necessity.  He points out that just because he was unable to mount a strong case for temporal necessity does not mean that is it not true.

Hunt argues that middle-knowledge has other problems such as the problem of evil because it implies God actualized a world where most people are condemned to hell.  Although Hunt said the issue was philosophical one, he concludes that middle-knowledge is not available as a theological aid because no one has developed or made sense of counterfactuals.[23]

An Augustinian-Calvinist Response

Helm agrees with Craig’s assessment of the Open view and finds his conceptualist approach and ideas on omniscience as plausible.  However, Helm disagrees with counterfactuals fatalism and Craig’s contention that the Augustinian-Calvinist view makes God the author of sin.

Helm is concerned that Craig has not shown that the middle-knowledge has resolved the conflict between creaturely freedom and divine foreknowledge.  Helm believes this middle-knowledge is attractive to the likes of Armenians because it seems to resolve the conflict. 

Helm contends it is unfair to label Augustinian-Calvinists as fatalists.  His position is that man can have freedom in some sort of sense or, possibly, not at all.

Craig’s contention that Helm’s position turns God into the creator of evil is a form of fatalism that is not one used in classic Greek.  Helm contends fatalism is inaccurate not because God ordains evil only that he allows evil.  Helm concludes that there isn’t a material difference between the middle-knowledge and his position.

The Augustinian-Calvinist View by Paul Helm

Helm begins by stating that the dilemma of God’s foreknowledge is between God’s omniscience and human freedom.  For Helm, their divine foreknowledge and human free will are not logically incompatible.  Helm offers three arguments for his position. 

Helm states the argument is constrained by the biblical witness and, if to stay within that witness creates inconsistency, then so be it.[24] He admits his arguments will make the Augustinian position logically possible, even if it is not compelling.

Helm divides our responsibility into responsibility before God (GR) and responsibility before man (HR).  This leaves us with two fixed imperatives, first, that God is sovereign and second, humans are accountable before God.  Helm concedes that we will never fully comprehend how divine sovereignty and human responsibility reconcile.

Helm argues that man cannot want to want God, therefore man’s will is not sufficient to obtain salvation.[25]  This, Helm contends, demonstrates a superficial incompatibility between God’s foreknowledge and human freewill.[26]

Helm contends that theologians have defined omniscience in different ways in respect to the scope of God’s knowledge.  Helm believes we should favor the definition that gives the maximal knowledge to God.  Helm argues that evil acts allowed by God, while known by God, are not willed by God.

Finally, Helm argues that we do not need to posit libertarian freedom in order to explain the relation between divine and human activity.[27]  In fact, Helm argues God’s foreknowledge necessarily entails that events comes to pass.

Helm addresses some common objection to his position.  Helm argues that God being timeless does not make foreknowledge compatible with human freedom.[28]   Helm objects because the idea of soft and hard facts is not very clear and only addresses God’s knowledge and not His beliefs about the future.  Finally, Helm reiterates that middle-knowledge does not satisfy the incompatibility for his previously stated reasons.

An Open-Theism Response

Boyd argues that Helm’s problem is, that if God foreknows future free acts, then future free acts are necessary.  Boyd agrees with Helm that if this is true then there is no such thing as libertarian freewill. 

Boyd defends his argument that we have no warrant for interpreting certain biblical passages anthropomorphically.  He insists that changing the motif of the passages actually undermines the true meaning of those biblical passages.

Boyd contends that much of Helms argument is based on his Calvinistic understanding of salvation. Boyd argues that there is no need to deny human freewill in order to affirm that salvation is completely a matter of God’s grace.[29] Boyd concludes the best interpretation of the biblical passages is that a person is saved to the glory of God and dammed by their will.

A Simple-Foreknowledge Response

Hunt responds to each of Helms arguments.  First, Hunt says he argues against the idea that divine foreknowledge excludes human freewill in anything other than a compatibilist sense.[30] Hunt argues that his position is the true Augustinian position and argues that Helm’s position is actually based on Johnathan Edwards.

Hunt explains that both of them avoid the Boethian solution but for different reasons.  Hunt explains his avoidance was because the Boethian position exempts God for the dilemma without solving it, while Helm does not think the Boethian position can’t exempt God form the dilemma.

Hunt explains that Helm’s second argument was hard to follow.  He attempts to explain the argument and show the argument Helm puts further suffers from the fallacy of affirming the consequent.  Hunt explains that Helm inadvertently limits God’s power.[31] In addition Helm’s position is still problematic because of the compatibility of determinism and human responsibility. Hunt concludes that if we are under universal causal determination then God is the ultimate cause of all of our actions.

Finally, Hunt argues that Helm’s conception of libertarian freedom has nothing to do with divine foreknowledge.  Hunt believes that Helm has overlooked a crucial difference between his position and that of Hunt’s and Augustine’s, namely the issue of man’s responsibility.  Hunt finds Helm’s distinction of responsibility unhelpful.  Hunt concludes that causal determinism is incompatible with moral responsibility.

Hunt concedes that all of the positions are within orthodoxy and the reason for the diversity of positions is because it is extremely difficult to bring all the themes together in a single coherent system.[32] Hunt leaves it to the reader to determine who has made the best argument.

A Middle-Knowledge Response

Craig affirms Helm’s stance against the open view.  However, Craig is quick to point out that the reason people are held accountable is precisely because they have libertarian freedom.[33]  Craig continues by demonstrating Helm’s arguments that are based on compatibilism/incompatabilism are ill-conceived.   Craig states that both compatibilism and incompatabilism are consistent with human freedom.

Craig argues Helm’s position compromises Calvinistic doctrine of divine providence and still does nothing to elevate God as the source of evil.  Craig also finds that both Boyd’s and Helm’s view both endorse theological fatalism.  Craig points out that Helm finds no fault with the Molinist position and yet Helm insists they have already had a reason to reject it. Finally, Craig finds Helm’s argument for fatalism unsound.

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[1] Beilby, J. and Eddy, P. Ed., Divine Foreknowledge, Four Views (Downer’s Grove, IL, Inter-Varsity Press, 2001) kindle location (kl) 70 and 77

[2] Ibid kl 72

[3] Ibid kl 129

[4] Ibid kl 108

[5] Ibid kl 196

[6] Ibid kl 201

[7] Ibid kl 502

[8] Ibid kl 698

[9] Ibid kl 764

[10] Ibid kl 787

[11] Ibid kl 947

[12] Ibid kl 969

[13] Ibid kl 1300

[14] Ibid kl 1435

[15] Ibid kl 2448

[16] Ibid kl 1442

[17] Ibid kl 1466

[18] The middle knowledge position is often called Molinism after Luis de Molina. It is called middle knowledge because it logically lies between natural knowledge and free knowledge.

[19] Ibid kl 1499

[20] Ibid kl 1744

[21] Ibid kl 1810

[22] Ibid kl 1861

[23] Ibid kl 1929

[24] Ibid kl 2014

[25] Ibid kl 2119

[26] Ibid kl 2124-2127

[27] Ibid kl 2311

[28] Atemporal or outside of time.

[29] Ibid kl 2434

[30] Ibid kl 2445

[31] Ibid kl 2470

[32] Ibid kl 2516

[33] Ibid kl 2523